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Marx, architecture and modernity 
David Cunningham & Jon Goodbun 
 
Published in The Journal of Architecture Volume 11, Number 2 (2006), pp. 169-
185 
 
[Commissioned as report on the colloquium Marx, Architecture and Modernity 
held at the University of Westminster, May 2004] 
 
Although its obituaries continue to be popularly disseminated, Marxist thinking 
remains a significant intellectual force within contemporary cultural and critical 
theory, if not, so clearly, within mass politics. Indeed, in many respects, it seems 
healthier, leaner and more active in these areas than it has been for some time, 
renewed both by contemporary discourses surrounding globalization and the anti-
capitalist movement, and by various recent theoretical developments from Britain and 
North America to continental Europe and South America. More often than not such 
activity has been fed by a belated return to the writings of Marx himself. One thinks 
of Antonio Negri’s seminal post-workerist readings of the Grundrisse, David 
Harvey’s revisiting of the 1848 Manifesto, or the recent resurrection of debates 
surrounding the Hegelian character of Marx’s Capital, and its implications for 
contemporary philosophy and social theory.1 Equally, one thinks of Jacques Derrida’s 
influential and (at its time of writing) untimely intervention in Specters of Marx, or of 
Gilles Deleuze who died before completing a book he intended to call Grandeur de 
Marx. At the same time, Marx is increasingly proclaimed, as much on the right as on 
the left, to be the great prophet of contemporary globalisation; a prophet who, once 
stripped of his articulation of an alternative (communist) future uncoiling itself from 
within the very structures of the capitalist present, can be perversely ‘accepted by 
leading theorists of the American business class’ as the one thinker who actually 
reveals ‘the true nature of capitalism’.2 While there is much about this that should 
(and does) disquiet us – as the production of a ‘Marx’ devoid of all revolutionary 
fervour - it indicates why the writings of a thinker that Foucault once described as the 
author of an entire ‘discourse’ should appear, yet again, to have become the terrain 
upon which a series of current debates are destined to be fought out. 
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 At the very least, what the contemporary ideologues of globalisation recognise 
is that Marx matters today because he was, perhaps, the thinker, not only of 
nineteenth-century capitalism, but of ‘capitalism in itself’. As one commentator puts 
it, the ‘actuality’ of das Kapital is ‘that of its object…capital itself – an insatiable 
vampire and fetish-automaton now more invasive than ever’.3 With the dramatic 
implosion of ‘historical communism’ in Eastern Europe, and the accelerated 
absorption of non-Western societies into the resurgent regimes of capital 
accumulation that it helped to generate, Marx’s analyses of ‘capitalism in itself’ are 
thus of increasing, not decreasing, relevance; though accompanying this is a demand 
that they not become petrified again in the suffocating grip of doctrinal ‘orthodoxy’. 
A return to Marx today is not, or should not be, a return to the Same and the already 
given.4 Still, if ‘capital obviously does not operate in the way it did in the nineteenth 
century…yet it operates’. And, whatever its flaws (which remain open to debate), we 
do not have a better starting point for its critical analysis than Marx.5 
It was with this in mind that we organised, in May 2004, a small one-day 
colloquium at the University of Westminster in London which sought to bring some 
of these trans-disciplinary debates to bear upon the discipline of architecture; a 
colloquium, and a general idea, that appears to have generated some interest and, 
hence, seems worth recounting and exploring further here.6 In inviting various people 
to contribute to this discussion, we were guided by a concern to engage the 
implications for architectural knowledge of what appear to us to be three particularly 
significant (and, in one sense, ‘heretical’) developments of Marxian thought, each of 
which possesses considerable contemporary resonance. 
The first of these, and the most directly architectural, is the body of work 
authored by Manfredo Tafuri and the Venice School, and its ongoing dissemination 
and extension through the work of Anglophone theorists such as Frederic Jameson. 
Although Tafuri's work continues, slowly, to gain respect across the broader field of 
cultural studies, architectural theory has, paradoxically, largely avoided confronting 
and developing this difficult legacy; perhaps precisely because of the difficult 
questions it raises for the architectural profession itself. Justified by simplistic 
accusations of ‘structural pessimism’ and lack of a ‘specific methodology for 
architectural activity’, neglect looks increasingly like mere evasion of some 
uncomfortable issues.7 Anthony Vidler and Gail Day’s recent critical engagements 
present an honourable exception, and, as they demonstrated in their papers at the 
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colloquium, both are, not coincidentally, distinguished by an attention to the properly 
Marxist dimensions of Tafuri’s oeuvre. 
By contrast to Tafuri’s relative neglect, the enormity of both Walter 
Benjamin’s and Henri Lefebvre’s respective contributions to a thinking about spatial 
culture has at least succeeded in achieving widespread recognition, (if at times 
superficially), in architectural and urbanist circles. The recent interventions of Marxist 
or ‘post-Marxist’ urbanists and geographers (such as Harvey and Castells), who have 
been inspired by Lefebvre in particular, is one of the most promising of recent 
developments. In the case of Benjamin, it is in the potential he provides for something 
like a phenomenological account of urban experience that his influence has been 
perhaps most profoundly felt, generating the groundwork for a vast array of 
contemporary theoretical projects. Together, although they in fact represent quite 
distinct legacies, it’s fair to say that Benjamin and Lefebvre have been the guiding 
theoretical lights for an elaboration of a specifically ‘culturalist’ (as opposed to 
sociological-empirical) approach to the urban8 that has had an almost unprecedented 
impact upon architectural history and theory in recent times. It was from this position 
that, in their respective papers at the colloquium, Iain Borden outlined a possible 
Marxian phenomenology grounded in a Lefebvrian rhythm-analysis of everyday 
space, and Jane Rendell attempted to counsel the “unhappy marriage” of Marxism and 
feminism. 
The third strand we identified in the colloquium, which to some degree 
mediates the concerns of the others, is the recent (often broadly philosophical) 
reviews of Marxist thought developed around the histories and theories of the avant-
garde, taking up the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School as well as the artistic 
practices of Dada, Surrealism, Situationism, and their heirs.9 Peter Osborne’s writings 
on the ‘architectural turn’ in post-conceptual art practice and culture would be one 
key instance of this, emphasising the socio-political underpinnings of this ‘turn’, as a 
desired engagement with art’s institutional structuring and its opening out on to the 
city beyond.10 More broadly, the question of the avant-garde raises here the issue of 
what role might still be played, today, by imaginings of a qualitatively different non-
capitalist future at a moment when, as Tafuri unceasingly reminds us, such 
imaginings may simply provide ideological and aesthetic cover for the ongoing 
reproduction of capitalism itself.11 
 If each of these strands inherits a Marxian discourse in some way, such 
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inheritance is never a simple process. A legacy is neither automatic nor homogenous, 
and true inheritance is always, in some part of itself, a kind of betrayal, as it must be 
to be true at all. We do not wish here, therefore, to speak for the participants in the 
discussion we have sought to initiate, or to corral them into a unified theory of ‘Marx, 
Architecture and Modernity’. Rather we want to respond, often obliquely, to the 
questions they have helped us to articulate, and, in doing so, to offer the reader some 
broad account of just a few of the issues that might be at stake in all this. 
 
Marx. Architecture 
What then would constitute the relationship between the terms ‘Marx’ and 
‘Architecture’? Indeed, what do we want to signify by ‘Marx’? We have, clearly, the 
historical nineteenth-century figure Karl Marx and his known writings (both the 
published texts and notebooks). And it is clear from these that Marx did not set out 
anything like a coherent Marxist theory of architecture upon which we could draw. 
Nor, for that matter, did he set out a coherent Marxist theory of either aesthetics or 
space (a point that will be returned to). Yet, his texts are full of a range of suggestive 
architectural, spatial and bodily references. 
Engels famously described Marx’s project as coming out of the synthesis of 
three strands of European thought: economics (British), politics (French), and 
philosophy (German).  Architectural knowledge at times must deal with similar 
syntheses, and so it is perhaps not surprising that it provides some fertile material for 
Marx. It is worth setting out what some of this material is. There are firstly the texts 
that deal directly with an urban (and, thus, implicitly architectural) subject matter, 
such as the section on the country and the city in the German Ideology of 1845, and in 
the 1848 Manifesto, or the constant references and comments on the processes and 
effects of industrial urbanisation. There are also texts on housing and urbanism by 
Marx’s collaborator Engels. More generally, and significantly for our concerns, there 
is a sense in which, for Marx, the basic productive ‘impulses’ of the ‘architectural’ 
and the ‘urban’ are understood as co-originary with the human itself. Or at least, 
human consciousness is for his ‘philosophy’, as he began to develop it from the early 
1840s, simultaneously produced through the act of producing an environment; an 
environment, a worked matter, which is understood as both alienated and alienating 
consciousness.12 Marx must thus be understood as both, first, a theorist of human 
production generally, and, second, a theorist of capitalist production in particular. He 
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provides the theoretical foundations for his own relevance, as it were, by initially 
theorising how the human is produced, and then looking at our particular historical 
form of that production. 
It would be interesting to relate this to, for example, the recent arguments of 
Edward Soja who, drawing on the archaeological research of Kathleen Kenyon and 
James Mellaart, asserts the existence of what he calls a First Urban Revolution, 
essentially co-terminous with human society as such, beginning in Southwest Asia 
over 10,000 years ago - the development of pre-agricultural urban settlements of 
hunters, gatherers and traders that he identifies with the ‘spatially specific’ urban 
forms to be found at Jericho in the Jordan Valley and Çatal Hüyük in southern 
Anatolia. This inversion of the usual historical narrative, in which the agricultural 
‘revolution’ precedes the urban, has profound consequences for rethinking any 
‘natural-historical’ account of the human, and for the phenomenological implications 
(to which we will return below) of what Soja describes as a process, beginning ‘with 
the body’, by which the human is produced through a ‘complex relation with our 
surroundings’. The social is, as Marx implicitly recognised, ‘always at the same time 
intrinsically spatial’.13 Expanding the term ‘building’ to ‘city’ or ‘metropolis’, we can 
understand, then, the workings of a broader dialectic of architectural production, 
consciousness, alienation and experience perpetually at work in Marx’s writings (if 
somewhat marginalized in their development). The discourse of Marx and the 
discourse that emerged around space simultaneously co-developed out of Young 
Hegelian preoccupations with the relationship between matter and spirit. These are 
thus texts that share concerns with architectural thought, and which make his 
infiltration into architectural theory possible. A key example would be from his early 
writings, in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, composed in 1843-4.14 
Here Marx outlines what can be read as something like a body-based materialist 
phenomenology of technology, located in the notion that man ‘is affirmed in the 
objective world not only in the act of thinking, but with all his senses’.15 The senses, 
Marx famously writes, have become ‘theoreticians in their immediate praxis…Apart 
from these direct organs, social organs are therefore created in the form of 
society…[as] a mode of appropriation of human life’.16 For Marx, the (collective and 
‘individual’) subject is, as Etienne Balibar states, ‘nothing other than practice which 
has already begun and continues indefinitely’.17 As this early ‘natural-historical’ 
account would have it, the biological species, therefore, only becomes human when it 
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begins to produce its own environment through social co-operation. In this sense what 
Marx means by the economic is, most fundamentally, a mediation between social and 
biological aspects. Production is the source of a ‘universality’ which makes the 
‘whole of nature’ man’s ‘inorganic body’.18 Nature becomes, via technics, a 
prosthetic extension which defines the human itself, in the sense that the human is 
intrinsically (rather than merely secondarily) prosthetic. The technical is, as Bernard 
Stiegler has insisted (thinking of both Marx and Heidegger), more than a ‘tool’: it is a 
condition of the invention of the human itself.19 The significance of such an idea for 
an expanded conception of architectural praxis, and of the historical logic of the 
urban, should be apparent.  
Indebted, no doubt, to a certain German Romantic tradition of aesthetic 
philosophy in general, and spatial aesthetic theory in particular - which we know 
Marx was reading, and continued to read, throughout his life – texts such as this 
suggest that, in its original formulations and sources, one way of understanding the 
Marxist ‘synthesis’ of economics, politics and philosophy would be through the use of 
aesthetic structures in economic and political formations. Thus in Marx’s later move 
toward an apparently ‘purer’ economic focus, in the Grundrisse and Capital, certain 
aesthetic models can still be found at work both within the analysis of the form of the 
commodity-object itself, and within the concept of commodity fetishism.20 In a sense, 
much of Benjamin’s most famous work – probably without any direct influence from 
Marx’s early writings – starts from here, though, typically, its ‘roots’ in Marxian 
thought tend to be occluded by many of his most enthusiastic proponents in 
contemporary cultural and urban studies. And, again, this is not without direct 
relevance to architectural questions. In a famous passage towards the end of ‘The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, Benjamin writes: 
 
Buildings have been man’s companions since primeval times. Many art forms 
have developed and perished…[But] architecture has never been idle. Its history 
is more ancient than that of any art, and its claim to being a living force has 
significance in every attempt to comprehend the relationship of the masses to 
art…[The] mode of appropriation, developed with reference to architecture, in 
certain circumstances acquires canonical value. For the tasks which face the 
human apparatus of perception at the turning points of history cannot be solved 
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by optical means, that is, by contemplation, alone. They are mastered gradually 
by habit.21 
 
In this conception - that the ‘mode of human sense perception changes with 
humanity’s entire mode of existence…determined not only by nature but by historical 
circumstances as well’ - we have the basis for an entire Marxian-phenomenological 
account of the architectural as spatial practice.  
If the terms of phenomenology can seem dubious in contemporary 
architectural theory, and unlikely to intersect with a Marxist thought, it is, no doubt, 
because of the ethico-sentimental conservatism which has tended to define such  
thinking in recent decades. Typically, architectural phenomenologies, such as those of 
Christian Norberg Schultz, Dalibor Veseley, or Juhani Pallasnaa (to name some of the 
more successful) have all tended in various ways to problematically essentialise and 
dehistoricise the experiencing body, emphasising the supposedly ‘timeless’ and 
‘natural’, confusing philosophical methods and polemical ambitions. Whilst one 
might sympathise with the desires to ameliorate the alienating effects of spectacle and 
rampant consumer capitalism that often seem to animate these discourses, one must 
maintain the demand for a sober historical phenomenology that accounts for the 
body’s ever shifting interaction with its environment; an interaction which has 
undergone fundamental and irreversible change in the ‘second nature’ of capitalist 
modernity. This is not to deny that there are components of our bodies and 
environments that undergo very slow change, and a sophisticated Marxian 
phenomenology might unravel the simultaneous and competing spatialities and 
temporalities at work in our experiencing. Indeed it is perhaps in the nearly timeless, 
and therefore, at one level, effectively ‘pre-capitalist’, slow rhythms of the body, that 
we might find the basis for some forms of future resistance to the commodification of 
our bodies and environments. Yet this does not efface the need for a properly socio-
historical account of our ‘complex relation with our surroundings’.  
At the same time, undoing the largely conservative determinations of 
phenomenology is often hampered by the dominantly iconographic (rather than 
properly spatial) model which now drives, inside and outside of the academy, a 
contemporary understanding of architectural meaning; and which requires us to revise 
somewhat Benjamin’s assertions regarding architecture’s non-auratic character. This 
itself takes place in a cultural context in which a select group of architects are 
 8
increasingly fêted as the great figures of artistic genius and power in our time. 
Intensifying what Tafuri saw as the irreversible reduction of its socially 
transformative ambitions to a ‘form without utopia…to sublime uselessness’,22 such 
uselessness has itself, paradoxically if inevitably, proved to be of great ideological use 
to the contemporary imperatives of capital accumulation. The contemporary ‘drama’ 
of architecture thus appears, dominantly, as one of spectacle and brand image. As 
against this, the essential Marxist task should become one of reconceiving a genuinely 
modernist conception of spatial practice as the condition for architectural knowledge, 
that is, the production of a phenomenological account of the spatio-temporal forms 
through which the distinctive social relations of capitalist modernity are reproduced 
and extended. While architecture cannot itself overcome such relations, in its 
reflection upon them it can at least promote a lucid awareness of their conditions, and 
an understanding of the new forms of subjective experience that it produces. This 
would seem to us to be the basis for a broadly Marxian analysis today. 
 
Modernity 
What about our third term then – modernity? How might a ‘return’ to the writings of 
Marx inform our specific understanding of architecture and modernity, and of their 
interrelation, at this point? For Marshall Berman, famously, Marx and Engels’ 1848 
Communist Manifesto is an expression of some of modernism’s ‘deepest insights 
[which], at the same time, dramatizes some of its deepest inner contradictions’, both 
one of the classic texts of political ‘modernism’, and ‘the archetype of a century of 
modernist manifestos and movements to come’.23 And, in the passage that provides 
the title for Berman’s All That is Solid Melts into Air, we find a brilliant account of 
modernity by Marx himself:  
 
It [the bourgeoisie] has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian 
pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted 
expeditions that put into the shade all former Exoduses of nations and 
crusades. The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the 
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with 
them the whole relations of society. Conservation of old modes of production 
in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all 
earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted 
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disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation 
distinguish the bourgeoisie epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast frozen 
relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are 
swept away, all new formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. 
All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last 
compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his 
relations with his kind. The need for a constantly expanding market for its 
products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must 
nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. […] 
The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has 
created enormous cites, has greatly increased the urban population as 
compared with the rural, and thus rescued a considerable part of the 
population from rural idiocy.24 
 
Noting the presence of architecture and the urban at both ends of this very famous 
passage, we should say something of what we understand by the terms ‘modernity’ 
and ‘modernism’ in relation to these paradigmatically spatial discourses. 
 For Berman, this passage describes – precisely in phenomenological, as well 
as socio-economic fashion (though the two cannot in fact be separated) – the 
experience of modernity (Berman’s subtitle). Modernity here embraces both what he 
terms modernization - the general process of socio-economic and technological 
development - and modernism - the various cultural and/or ‘subjective’ responses to 
this process of modernization - and, to a degree that Berman himself fails to bring out, 
modernity articulates something of the shared spatio-temporal form of both. As 
Osborne puts it, in what may be regarded, in part, as a reading of the Marx passage, 
modernity, in these terms, refers to something like a ‘culture of temporal abstraction’: 
 
[Modernity] defines a distinctive structure of historical experience. 
Nonetheless, the unity of this structure notwithstanding, its concrete meanings 
are subject to significant historical variation, relative to the specific terms and 
boundaries of the various fields of experience that are subjected to its temporal 
logic, and to the specific modes of negation that are employed. […] 
‘Modernity’ is the name for an actually existing, or socially realised, temporal 
formalism that is constitutive of certain formations of subjectivity. It is in this 
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sense that it is a distinctively ‘cultural’ category: the fundamental form of 
time-consciousness in capitalist societies.25 
 
Modernism would, then, in turn, be the general ‘name’ for a cultural or subjective 
self-consciousness about, and expression of, this temporal logic of modernity, and of 
its dialectic of negation and newness: a ‘constant revolutionising’ that incessantly 
negates all ‘fixed, fast frozen relations’. Artistically, the modernist work is that which, 
in some way, registers this non-identity of modernity and tradition within itself, 
engaging the social logic of capitalist modernity at the level of form   
All this is broadly well known and understood, and Berman’s terms are ones 
that have often been taken up in architectural theory over the last decade or so, most 
recently by Hilde Heynen.26 Yet they need here to be reconnected to that social logic 
of ‘capitalism itself’ if we are to draw out their full significance; a reconnection which 
requires a certain ‘return’ to Marx. Let us thus re-read the Marx passage and note one 
of its other theoretical ‘dimensions’: ‘The need for a constantly expanding market for 
its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle 
everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere’. For Marx himself, 
the temporal condition of modernity described by Osborne is, then, simultaneously 
the production of (and may be produced out of) new spatial relations. That is to say, 
modernity’s progressive intensification of a temporal logic also entails a progressive 
negation of certain historically-specific spatial logics and relations – most obviously, 
those associated with ‘place’ as traditionally conceived in terms of physical contiguity 
or belonging. As Marx writes in the Grundrisse, in capitalist modernity there is a 
sense in which ‘even spatial distance reduces itself to time’: ‘While capital must on 
one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse, i.e., to exchange, and 
conquer the whole world for its market, it strives on the other side to annihilate this 
space with time’.27 Thus, as the fundamental form of time-consciousness within 
capitalist society, modernity equally serves to constitute its fundamental form of 
space-consciousness – the ultimate horizon of a ‘connectivity’ of an ‘everywhere’, of 
pure equi-valence.   
We will not be the first to note that, although Marx himself only implies the 
term, such a spatial form and consciousness of connectivity takes, among its most 
famous names, that of the metropolis, which, for Simmel, was space as ‘dominated’ 
by the money economy. As a system of connectivity, the metropolis is formed, as 
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Benjamin says in one of his conversations with Brecht, by a ‘boundless maze of 
indirect relationships, complex mutual dependencies and compartmentations’.28 The 
space of the metropolis is one made up of newly differentiated and variegated flows 
of connection, where the individual subject is increasingly dependent upon an 
ensemble of rationalised and abstract mediations of social relations that resist 
understanding. Above all, as modern form, the metropolis is a dynamic technical 
system of relations or references – i.e. precisely what Marx calls a system of 
production - which, in a historical sense, defines the very nature of the human itself. 
In this sense, the metropolis might well be understood conceptually as the spatial 
correlate, the material support, of the culture (of temporal abstraction) of modernity in 
general.29 Such a reading would, we think, follow directly from the passage from the 
Manifesto. This is implicit also in Berman, whose book is essentially a compendium 
of the urban experience ofParis, St. Petersburg and New York.  
At any rate, in these terms, what we understand by modernism, in architecture, 
cannot thus be reduced solely to its use of new technologies or materials - glass, steel, 
reinforced concrete - nor to its particular, diverse stylistic forms and rhetorics, but, 
above all, must be understood through its ineliminable engagement with, and 
subjection to, the spatial and temporal forms of the urban. Architecture’s modern 
identity cannot be disentangled from the larger social and spatial formations of what 
Marx describes as a subjection of ‘the country to the rule of the towns’. What Beatriz 
Colomina says of Loos, that the ‘subject of [his] architecture is the citizen of the 
metropolis, immersed in its abstract relations’, is true in far more general terms.30 
From nineteenth-century utopianism and functionalism, through Le Corbusier and 
Mies, to the likes of Koolhaas and Herzog and de Meuron today, it is the historical 
increase in ‘the urban population as opposed to the rural’, one of the key social logics 
of capitalist modernity, and the spatial conditions of this historically new metropolitan 
life, which is the always implicit subject of modern architecture, and in relation to 
which it must irresistibly articulate itself. Modernism is, in part, the question of what 
such a life might mean, and of what forms it can and should take. 
Let us return to the ‘architectural’ examples in the passage from the 
Communist Manifesto itself in order to begin to unpack what we might understand 
more specifically by architectural modernity here. What exactly are the ‘wonders far 
surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals’ that 
capitalist modernity has ‘accomplished’? What is their nature and historical logic? 
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Capitalism has consistently visualised, symbolised and articulated its most radical 
ideas and practices through both real and imagined spatial developments and 
experiences, from the nineteenth-century Great Exhibitions and urban infrastructures 
to the contemporary resorts of Las Vegas. As well as existing as commodities and 
spectacles, these and almost all architectural objects are themselves a new part of the 
production cycle. In a self-evident way a factory building is part of the ‘means of 
production’. Slightly less obvious but just as structural to production are the airport, 
the high-speed rail system, the shopping centre, and the home itself. 
A principle manifestation of modernism in architecture is the communication 
of new processes of modernisation. Most visibly this has been the expression of new 
construction technologies and materials. There is little need to repeat the canonic 
histories of steel, glass and concrete architectural expression over the last century, or 
to remind the reader of the communicative potential of contemporary developments 
such as computer-aided manufacturing or ecological design. However, processes of 
modernisation have of course not been restricted to construction, but would certainly 
include organisational technologies and media technologies as well. Again, very 
familiar examples of modernism constituted through what are conceived of as 
processes of modernisation could be drawn from both its canonic and marginal 
histories. In addition there are buildings that express cultural or subjectively formed 
responses to the experience of modernity - as well as buildings which might self-
consciously articulate, as ‘objects’, experiences of modernity in themselves. In recent 
years, Peter Eisenman for example has repeated stated that his work confronts an 
alienated modern subjectivity through the production of equally alienated ‘post-
humanist’ objects - using an argument more convincingly employed by Michael 
Hayes in his discussion of the historical avant garde.31 Libeskind too, in the Jewish 
Museum at least, has attempted to use the physical experience of alienation induced 
through the occupation of architectural form as a method for intensifying narrative 
programme. In a similar though more easily generalizable way, Zaha Hadid has 
claimed to be involved in an implicitly politicized ‘continuation of the unfinished 
modern project’ – and certainly in schemes like the Leipzig BMW plant, it might be 
argued that the formal abstractions employed by the architect intensify the spatial 
experience of modern programme. Similar claims can be made about the work of an 
increasing number of converging practices – UN Studio, Future Systems or Ushida 
Findlay to name just some of the usual suspects - although, of course, any 
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contemporary building is, in principle, generative of such experience, as indeed are 
the global-metropolitan spatial structures that we occupy, from railway stations and 
airports to the World Wide Web. As Marx indicated in 1848, our historical form of 
space-consciousness does indeed entail, with ever increasing force, a compulsion to 
‘establish connections everywhere’ as a very condition of the spatial environment – a 
compulsion which resonates in, for example, David Greene’s Locally Available 
World Unseen Networks, the ‘negative utopianism’ of Superstudio’s Continuous 
Monument, or much of Koolhaas’s most important work; various visions of an 
architectural web that might encompass the entire planet. Such ‘examples’ would 
clearly be near endless. The crucial point here, however, is a more general and 
structural one. What do we mean by the modernity of ‘modern’ architecture itself? 
And how does this, in turn, relate to modernity’s complex imbrication with the logics 
of capitalist development? If, as Osborne says, the ‘distance from traditional cultural 
forms registered by radical temporal abstraction does indeed associate it with a 
particular culture’ - the culture of capital - to what extent does this imply that ‘the 
political content of any particular modernism is in some way compromised by this 
affinity, in advance’?32 Such, as we shall see, is Tafuri’s quintessentially Marxian 
question. 
 
Production 
For Marx, economic, political and social processes are articulated through dialectical 
relationships between three elements or moments: material productive forces (or the 
means/mode of production), actual social relations (or the division of labour, 
ownership and law) and spiritual consciousness (ideology: something ‘between’ the 
freedom of total man and alienated false consciousness). In taking up, and exploring 
the potentialities of this thought, we must reflect upon the objects, images, techniques 
and ideas through which architecture produces: its means of production. Similarly, we 
must consider what it produces. First, operating according to the demands of 
development, it produces particular material objects (buildings, environments, 
spectacle). Second, it produces social practices associated with both the production 
and consumption or occupation of these specific material objects and technologies. 
Third, it produces and reproduces itself as a discourse, as knowledge. These 
relationships undergo constant change. The emergence for example of computer aided 
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manufacturing technologies (a means of production) are opening up important new 
ways for architects to get involved in making things (shifts in the division of labour).  
Here we need to attend to specific histories charting the divisions of mental 
and physical labour within the production of spatial culture and the built environment 
– among these, as Vidler points out, the historical emergence of the profession of 
architecture itself as ‘autonomous’, as an ‘ideology’ in its own right: 
 
[It is this ideology] which, in the first instance was constructed in order to 
provide symbols in the form of monuments, to authorise works of public and 
private display, to provide aesthetic cover for the ramified building activities 
of capitalist society. […] it has informed the so-called ‘vandalism’ of the 
Revolutionary period, the building of Hausmann’s monuments, the 
experiments of Eiffel and Hennebique, the construction of state capitals from 
New Delhi to Chandigarh and Brasilia.33 
 
One could not find a more powerful exemplification of capitalism’s accomplishment 
of ‘wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic 
cathedrals’, its constant ‘revolutionising [of] the instruments of production, and 
thereby the relations of production’. Equally, however, as the likes of Andrew Saint 
and Graham Ive have insisted, actual spatial-social relations must be understood 
through specific histories and struggles around, for example, land ownership and 
property law in relation to which architectural ‘ideology’ comes to be defined. 
Unfortunately, such work still remains marginalised. 
In Lefebvre, who could offer something to such studies, space itself is, of 
course, conceived as commodity within capitalist modernity, but also as something far 
more structural to the workings of capital – as the spaces both through which capital 
flows and which are themselves generated by capital. Drawing, finally, on Tafuri in 
particular, and in light of Marx’s three ‘elements’ or ‘moments’, it is useful, therefore, 
to consider briefly what might be described as the three distinct tasks placed upon 
architectural knowledge in capitalist modernity. The first is to act as technicians of 
spatial development. Under capitalism, this is primarily the task of commodifying 
space. This is what the vast majority of architects spend the vast majority of their time 
involved in. The second task is a ‘poetic’ or artistic one, and is to do with somehow 
dealing with, expressing, intensifying or ameliorating the spatial experience of 
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modernity. The third task is a utopian or avant-garde one, and is to do with imagining 
alternative socio-spatial futures. Although all three are always present in each other to 
some degree, there have been moments in the struggle over social space and its modes 
of production where the third task, imagining alternative socio-spatial futures, 
becomes an urgent part of defining the first task – the work to be done by everyday 
technicians of spatial development. 
 
Avant-garde and Utopia 
The above is necessarily schematic, but such moments of struggle and futural 
imagining would include, most obviously, the first ten years in Russia following the 
revolution, where the relative positions of architects, the building industry and 
political structures were rethought at the same time as proposed and realised projects 
(from domestic objects to buildings to entire urban regions) which were at least partly 
embedded in these new social relations (the division of labour, ownership and law). 
Other particular moments would include the struggles over space in the Social 
Democratic cities of Germany, as famously analysed by Tafuri, and involving the 
activist tradition around Bruno Taut, the expressionists and the Artist’s Soviet, Ernst 
May, Martin Wagner, and others. Yet other moments would include the worldwide 
struggles over space that culminated in 1968, and which define one set of parameters 
for Lefebvre’s work. As well as projects like Constant’s (presently much celebrated) 
New Babylon, one also thinks of the (sometimes partly parodic or ironic) images of 
alternative socio-spatial futures produced by groups like Superstudio and Archigram: 
Benjaminian wish-images that necessarily suggest, whether through their endless 
megastructural audacity, or through the simple abolition of the building commodity, a 
revision of the ways that social space is owned, controlled and organised; a ‘utopian’ 
yearning for an alternate non-capitalist future that might be constructed out of the 
present.  
One of the many important problems raised by Tafuri – somewhat against the 
grain of Benjamin’s argument in this instance - is precisely to do with the viability of 
these images of alternative socio-spatial futures, which are potentially seen by him as 
being dangerous ideological veils, if not rooted in already existing changes to social 
relations. That is, such positions can threaten to result only in self-deception, 
obscuring real possibilities of transforming reality, and ultimately reinforce the 
relations they seek to displace. Unable to reflect upon the social conditions of its own 
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ideological status, and the division of labour sustaining it, the desire to overcome an 
institutional separation from the social life-world, on the part of art or architecture 
themselves, can only ever result in a false reconciliation under capitalism. Hence, for 
Tafuri, the unavoidably tragic history of the Benjaminian attempt to dissolve the 
auratic architectural object; a dissolution which may have been the only possibility of 
rendering itself ‘political’, but which - in the face of the production cycle of a 
metropolis that it could never control - found its ‘intrinsic limits’ always ‘exposed’. 
Yet we should return the ‘architectural problems treated’ here, as Tafuri himself 
demands, to the ‘theoretical context’ of the ‘most advanced studies of Marxist 
thought’ which originally defined them. Understanding of Tafuri’s writings within 
architectural discourse has been blocked by a failure to locate them in this way. Tafuri 
himself refers to the journal Contropiano, in which the essay ‘Towards a Critique of 
Architectural Ideology’ first appeared in 1969, and this title’s own evident allusion to 
Marx’s Critique of Political Economy.34 Read in this context it is clear that Tafuri’s 
notorious arguments actually constitute the architectural elaboration of what can be 
construed as a fairly classical Marxian critique of a reformist, social democratic 
attempt to work within existing socio-political institutions. At the same time, the 
twentieth-century avant-garde appears, for Tafuri, as something like a specifically 
urban repetition of romanticism’s founding naiveté – its utopian linkage of aesthetic 
absolutism to the work of politics – which itself repeats Marx’s own strictures against 
nineteenth-century utopian socialism (of the type propounded by Fourier). Marx’s 
critique of utopianism, like Tafuri’s, always rested upon its failure to yoke subjective 
transformative will to the real movement of social developments.  
 Yet this is not the whole story. The problem with Berman’s justly renowned 
reading of the Communist Manifesto is, for example, to be located in its ultimate 
reduction of modernity and modernism, against its own political intentions, to an 
essentially celebratory dynamic identified completely with the productive logic of 
capitalism itself; and there can be little doubt that Tafuri risks such a reduction also. 
Marx appears then as the great ‘poet’ of capitalist modernity, expressing and 
articulating its defining experience; a conception which enticingly prefigures his 
current reception as prophet of globalisation. Not that this is unimportant, but 
restricted to a kind of energetics of present upheaval – above all, the intoxicating 
maelstrom of metropolitan life – as it is in Berman in particular, it elides that other 
temporal dynamic so key to Marx’s ‘modernism’: its futural impulse towards a non-
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capitalist alternative. As such, before rushing to reiterate the usual obituary notices for 
the avant-garde’s ‘stratagems’, whether broadly ‘artistic’ or ‘political’ - that failure of 
transformative intent which, given its effective irresistibility, has never really been a 
failure at all (for what is a failure when, on its own terms, it could never have 
achieved success) - it would be more fruitful to reflect upon what is revealed by such 
ambitions themselves, what they may tell us about the character of the ‘screen’ on 
which they are projected.35 This would be, more modestly, to seek to comprehend 
something of our contemporary situation through a reflection upon its historical 
character, upon both its ideological resistances and prefigurations. At stake here 
would be, at the very least, the possibility of architectural form and knowledge as an 
ongoing medium for the expression of social contradiction; an expression which, 
nonetheless, takes place within, as Osborne says, ‘the horizon of their sublation’, of a 
possible post-capitalist future, even if such a future can apparently no longer be 
positively projected by the work.36 
Adorno makes, in his one essay devoted to architecture, what is itself an 
exemplary Marxist point: 
 
[Architectural work] is conditioned by a social antagonism over which the 
greatest architecture has no power: the same society which developed human 
productive energies to unimaginable proportions has chained them to conditions 
of production imposed upon them. […] This fundamental contradiction is most 
clearly visible in architecture.37 
 
It is this visibility – its formal and phenomenological registering of the disjunction 
between the (technological and social) possibilities and actuality of modernity - that 
gives architecture something of what Jameson calls its ‘emblematic significance’ (as 
in, for example, post-conceptual art, as well as in contemporary cultural theory): ‘its 
immediacy to the social’, the ‘seam it shares with the economic’.38 For Tafuri, we 
should remember, architecture is always, even at its most silent, the site of 
communicative spatial practices (perhaps especially at its most silent).39 
This relates, most obviously and immediately, today to architecture’s 
articulation of the internal and external historically-variable relations that it has to 
other cultural forms within the antagonistic reality of the capitalist metropolis to 
whose productive logics it is subjected - mass media, communication technologies, 
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advertising, commodity design, signage, retail display, and so on - so as to critically 
mediate and express existing forms of social conflict and laceration within itself. At 
the same time, however, such articulation takes place, globally, in the context of what 
is a geographically and culturally ‘uneven’ process of capitalist development, as 
Marxist geographers like David Harvey remind us. In this light, one of the 
weaknesses of both Tafuri’s and Berman’s somewhat over-totalizing accounts of 
modernism becomes apparent. For what Tafuri describes as a ‘prefiguration of an 
abstract final moment of development coincident with a global rationalization’ is, as a 
developmental process, by no means as monolithic or as absolute (even in its 
abstraction) as he appears to have supposed.40  
It is this that should, finally, cause us to complicate the account of modernity 
with which we started out. For, as Harvey points out, the description of modernity in 
the Communist Manifesto itself is not free of such problems, in its tendency to 
presume that ‘capitalist industry and commodification’ will lead to simple 
‘homogenization’. In fact, our global capitalist modernity presents itself only as a 
differentiated unity, in which such differences are themselves part of what capital 
accumulation and ‘market structures’ produces (not merely residues of some pre-
capitalist social form). In Harvey’s tentative words: ‘There is a potentially dangerous 
estimation within the Manifesto of the powers of capital…to mobilize geopolitically, 
within the overall homogenization achieved through wage labour and market 
exchange’.41 This ‘mobilization’ and ‘differentiation’, in its dialectic with 
‘homogenization’, clearly has considerable implications for the potentialities of 
contemporary architectural practice and knowledge; one which a moralistic and 
conservative phenomenology, centred around simplistic conceptions of ‘place’, is 
evidently unable to grasp. 
The reverberations of Marx’s account of capitalist modernity are 
extraordinary, and find their way into architectural discourse at many varied points. 
Here, for example, is Rem Koolhaas describing our present moment: a ‘moment when 
the electronics revolution seems about to melt all that is solid – to eliminate all 
necessity for concentration and physical embodiment’.42 Whatever one thinks of his 
(always provisional) ‘solutions’ to this ‘elimination’, perhaps no contemporary 
architect has seemed so engaged with the questions for architecture raised by what 
Marx foresaw as capitalist modernity’s key spatial consequences – the ‘annihilation of 
space [or, rather, place] by time’, the horizon of a ‘connectivity’ of an ‘everywhere’. 
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All ‘programmes’ thus ‘become abstract’, Koolhaas writes, ‘inasmuch as now they 
are no longer tied to a specific place or city, but fluctuate and gravitate 
opportunistically around the point offering the highest number of connections’.43 
What does this mean for architectural production? Murray Fraser has suggested that 
‘the tactics for Koolhaas in recent projects are those of spatial transgression within 
different cultural contexts, as in the public right of way that is to snake through the 
CCTV headquarters in Bejing, or embedded spatial redundancy, as in the wastage of 
retail volume in the Prada store at Rodeo Drive, Los Angeles’.44 Similarly, Hilde 
Heynen in her reading of the Zeebrugge Sea Terminal project understands Koolhaas 
as producing ‘a unique locus so that this particular intersection within the network is 
different from any other, giving character to the nondescript, incoherent area that 
Zeebrugge is at present’.45 Yet such difference must now be understood as part of that 
differentiated unity of global capitalist modernity itself, in which, as we have said, 
such differences are themselves part of what capital accumulation and ‘market 
structures’ produces. These are not residues of some pre-capitalist social form, or 
reactive enclaves bulwarked against the encroachment of modernity, but themselves 
part of a new spatial logic (of connectivity and abstraction that exceeds the logic of 
place) which it is Koolhaas’ great merit to have faced. It is not clear that an essentially 
aesthetic terminology of ‘character’, which precisely still seems linked to a spatial 
logic of place, will really be able to grasp this. 
The questions raised by all this are huge, and beyond the scope of this essay, 
but, as a prolegomenon to their further interrogation, it is in such a context that we 
find ourselves ‘returning’ to Marx. If ‘capitalism itself’ is, as we said at the outset, 
now more invasive than ever, a sober confrontation with its contemporary global 
reality is more urgent than ever. It is as part of such a confrontation that architecture 
might provide a critical knowledge, with genuine trans-disciplinary significance, 
which could, at the very least, tell us something of its social and spatial forms.
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